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Abstract Among the public health community, ‘all except malaria’ is often shorthand for
neglected tropical diseases. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s cause ce´le`bre, malaria receives a
tremendous amount of funding, as well as scientific and policy attention. Malaria has, however, diver-
gent biological, behavioural and socio-political guises; it is multiply implicated in the environments we
inhabit and in the ways in which we inhabit them. The malaria that focuses our attention crops up in the
back alleys of Dar es Salaam, brought into being by local labour and municipal governance – a version of
malaria that, we argue, is increasingly excluded in current eradication campaigns. This article considers
the cycles of public health amnesia, memory and neglect that construe the parasitological exchange
between man and mosquito. It begins by exploring the political concerns and technical capacities that
have transformed malaria into a global enemy. Combining these historical accounts with ethnographic
material, we suggest how malaria is disentangled from or conflated with particular places. Ultimately,
our aim is to reflect upon the relationship between scale of malaria control and its social consequence,
attending to the actors and relations that fall outside of contemporary global public health policy.
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Wars. So many wars. Wars outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars
against terrorism. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars against ignorance and
wars out of ignorance. My question is simple: Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the
intellectuals? Is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins?
(Bruno Latour, 2004)
The history of malaria in war might almost be taken to be the history of war itself.
(Col. C.H. Melville, 1910, p. 599)
Introduction
As wars go, the fight against malaria seems reasonably justified. First, malaria kills a lot of
people. Just how many is the subject of gripping statistics. According to the World Health
r 2011 The London School of Economics and Political Science 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 6, 1, 71–87
www.palgrave-journals.com/biosoc/
Organization (the WHO), one child in Africa dies every 30 seconds. The United Nations
report that at least 250 million contracted the disease last year. Second, the war has support.
Philanthro-capital investments, bilateral funding, public-private partnerships, patent pools
and prizes, Pan-African awareness concerts, ballads by Youssou N’Dour, T-shirts designed
by Ashton Kutcher and Puff Daddy – all point to why ‘all except malaria’ has become the
shorthand for neglected tropical diseases. It has catalysed the emergence of research
networks, charitable foundations, public health programmes, governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Pinned down through epidemiological profiles and projected
across scales, malaria has become a global enemy.
Despite that attention, neglect remains central to malaria’s high profile. After the first
malaria eradication campaign was abandoned in the late 1960s, funding for malaria-specific
health interventions decreased dramatically, causing case numbers to soar (Greenwood et al,
2005). That narrative of abandonment and resurgence, we suggest, is linked to a military-
industrial concern: an-all-or-nothing commitment that links health advances to technological-
innovation and pathogen-obliteration, constituting malaria anew along untapped markets and
neglected fronts. Scrutinizing the particular malaria confronted today, this article opens
consideration on the malarias that have been forgotten and that persist within the warzone.
The numbers of malaria fatalities indicate the epidemic proportions of the disease, but
obscure its multiplicity. Malaria encompasses a range of clinical manifestations, vector
pathways and biological entities. There are five types of parasites that infect humans –
Plasmodium falciparum, P. vivax, P. malariae, P. ovale and P. knowlesi – the first two are the
most common and P. falciparum is the most deadly.1 The parasite, moreover, has a complex
antigenic repertoire; scientists are only beginning to come to grips with the consequences of
the transcriptional variation in the parasite genome for drug resistance (Mackinnon and
Marsh, 2010). The vector is also highly adaptive – Anopheles gambiae undergo an ongoing
and rapid process of speciation. Across the tropics, entomologists have found new sister
species that are resistant to insecticides (Enayati and Hemingway, 2010). The pace at which
P. falciparum and A. gambiae evolve confounds efforts at disease prevention and control.
The relational nature of the disease – circulating between human and mosquito species –
also renders it highly susceptible to environmental and social change. The historical,
sociological and political life of the pathogen exceeds the moment of the parasitological
exchange; malaria is ‘a complex of interactions, providing the conditions for constituting the
disease as a specific natural entity through a social process of selective definition of malaria
and response’ (Turnbull, 1989, p. 286). Strategies of malaria control and prevention shape
the biology of the parasite, the epidemiology of the disease and the conditions of possibility
for those afflicted; in this way the fight against malaria can be understood as an ontological
project (Mol, 1999, 2002).2 Put differently, economic, ecological, political and historical
1 P. vivax, P. malariae and P. ovule are generally milder but chronic: P. knowlesi causes malaria in animals but
can also infect humans. As one of our excellent blind reviewers noted, in the context of massive control
campaigns that target Plasmodium falciparum, these other malarias are generally considered ‘neglected’.
2 As Mol (2002) explains in The Body Multiple: ‘ontology is not given in the order of things, but that,
instead, ontologies are brought into being, sustained, or allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day,
sociomaterial practices. Medical practices among themy Ontologiesy inform and are informed by our
bodies, the organisation of our health care systems, the rhythms and pains of our diseases, and the shape of
our technologies. All of these, all at once, all intertwined, all in tension’ (2002, p. 7, italics in original).
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factors evoke different articulations of malaria and enable certain practices of treatment and
control (Langwick, 2007).
This article tracks the contours of this belligerent malaria by reflecting on the interplay
between philanthropic neglect and attention, policy memory and amnesia, public health
penury and surfeit. We begin by drawing some insights from the history of malaria control,
sketching out the malarias fought in the early part of the twentieth century, the particular
version pursued by the Global Malaria Eradication Program (GMEP) in the 1950s and
1960s, and finally the one brought into focus by Bill and Melinda Gates today.
A malaria control research project in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania provides an empirical
grounding to scrutinize the distinct visions of malaria these approaches produce.3 Markedly
out-of-step with current R&D trends, this project approaches malaria through the back alleys
of the city. It focuses on eliminating the larvae of Anopheles mosquitoes found in pools
of stagnant water, drainage pipes and footprints – essentially, anywhere the pavement ends.
Malaria control here is not only a demanding task of detection, but a product of management,
an aspect of infrastructure, and most important, a continual civic achievement.
Shedding ethnographic light on the epidemiological reality elaborated by this project
reveals a relationship between techno-science and the social that is obscured by a large-scale
war on malaria. It also points to the limits of scalability; current policy and funding
formations struggle to come to grips with the malaria found in urban plots and tyre tracks.
This discrepancy between malaria control as an arduous, everyday practice and the targeting
of malaria as a global enemy has considerable consequences for public health.
By taking seriously the labour and work that goes into constituting and sustaining the
malaria control project in Dar es Salaam, we excavate malarias embedded in landscapes and
enmeshed in the ways in which we inhabit them.4 While these malarias form a part of the
epidemic at the focus of eradication campaigns, at the same time, they are excluded from
them. The struggle to maintain the Tanzanian programme suggests how contemporary
global health policy makes possible and fosters certain local practices and not others.
Finally, we suggest that careful attention needs to be paid to the links as well as the
ruptures between practices and policies of malaria control. Following Steve Hinchliffe and
Nick Bingham, this article looks to larviciding for ‘hints that there are other ways of
collectively living with disease than imagining that we are perpetually in conflict with it,
ways that recognise rather than repress the fragile stabilities involved’ (Hinchliffe and
Bingham, 2008, p. 20). Rather than joining into the battle cry of malaria eradication, this
article argues that bringing the back alleys of global health onto front stage might let us find
better ways to connect labscapes of innovation to landscapes of wellbeing (Kohler, 2002).
Larval States
All this looks very formidable on paper. It is not so in reality. A very few men working
day after day will do wonders in the course of a few months. The great thing is to make
3 For an ethnographic elaboration of this project please see Kelly (2011a, Forthcoming).
4 By referencing ‘malarias’ at times in the plural, we seek to unpack the multiple concepts of disease, their
attendant differences in intervention and the various biomedical realities that are often elided by the single
word ‘malaria’.
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a beginning: not to form counsels of perfection, not to measure means with ends, but
simply to set to work with whatever force there is available, however small it may be.
A single private citizen can eradicate malaria from a whole town. In an enterprise of
this nature, the means grow as the work proceeds. (Ross, 1910, p. 31)
Long before it became the target of a global assault, malaria has been associated with
war. Historians have noted the decisive role malaria has played in battles, alternatively
scourge and strategy for advancing armies (for example, Beadle and Hoffman, 1993; Rusell,
2001; Snowden, 2006). In his work on malaria in Egypt, Timothy Mitchell compares the
70 000 casualties following the Allies first decisive victory at Al-Almein in 1942 to the deaths
from bites by infected mosquitoes, which numbered between one-hundred and two-hundred
thousand (Mitchell, 2002, pp. 19–54).5 The disease curtailed commercial endeavours across
Africa (Curtin, 1961) and fuelled rebellion in the Caribbean (Dayan, 1995). Linked to
situations of conflict and conquest, expansion and resettlement, malaria’s career as
a scientific object is frequently attributed to the interests of empire. Indeed, it was a French
army physician in Algeria, Charles Laveran, who first observed Plasmodium parasites in his
patient’s blood-slides; a discovery followed by Ronald Ross, a surgeon assigned to the Indian
Medical Forces, who associated the life-cycle of the parasite with Anopheles mosquitoes.6
But the malaria that accompanies the transgression of boundaries – the malaria of
wartime, of demographic change and ecological transformation – does not delimit the
disease that came into focus at the turn of the twentieth century. Malaria was also a social
disease, ‘connected with the economic and political life of the people who inhabit the regions
where it dominates’ (Celli, 1900, p. 2 cited in Packard, 2007, p. 111). Indeed, the origins
of the name, mal-aria or ‘bad air’, suggests its association with those unfortunate enough
to work in marshes, fight in trenches or sleep without roofs over their heads. Where the
incidence of malaria mapped onto the least capitalized areas of the country, the disease’s
ontological status could not be so easily reduced to parasitological exchange (Humphreys,
2001). Indeed, while Ross’s microscope in a garrison outpost may have provided the
proof of the transmission, it was a model home set up outside of Rome by Robert Manson
that settled the question of malaria epidemiology (Wilkinson, 2002).7 The siting of
5 Comparable statistics are associated with the American Civil War, when malaria is believed to have caused
three-fifths of the Federal casualties and two-thirds of the Confederate losses – 10 000 men in total (Sartin,
1993) and World War II, where malaria felled American soldiers in the Pacific roughly eight times faster
than the Japanese soldiers did (Rusell, 2001, p. 116).
6 Other key actors in this history of discovery were Patrick Manson, also a colonial medical officer in China
and the founding director of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Manson postulated the
mosquito-malaria theory, for which Ross established scientific proof. Giovanni Battista Grassi, an Italian
zoologist, who discovered the transmission process for avian malaria, and simultaneously to Ross, proved
the connection between mosquitoes, parasites and humans. The priority of the discovery became an issue of
extended dispute. Needless to say, behind the big men, was the work of unaccredited technicians and field
workers. For a novelistic treatment of the role of Ross’s laboratory assistant Kishori Mohan
Bandyopadhyay, see Gosh (2001).
7 The hut, made ‘mosquito proof’ with screens in the windows and doors, kept visiting scientists and their
servants malaria-free for three months during the height of the Italian fever season. Grassi’s telegram to
Manson, a telegram dated 13 September 1900, read: ‘Assembled in British mosquito proof hut having
versified (sic) [instead of ‘verified’] perfect health of experimenters among malaria stricken inhabitants. I
greet Manson, who first formulated mosquito malaria theory’ (Capanna, 2006, 9, pp. 69–74).
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the experiment within the home underscores the link between malaria and the material
conditions of everyday existence (Kelly, forthcoming).
In the years that followed, approaches to disease control would differ in the degree to
which they emphasized the domestic character of malaria. For some, malaria remained a
product of the general squalor, best controlled through improvements in housing,
agricultural innovation and economic reforms.8 For others, there was no malaria without
Anopheles; to fight the disease meant disentangling the vector from broader social concerns
(Farley, 2003). Ronald Ross fell into the latter camp: for him, improving public health
was tied to the task of at the very least controlling, and preferably eliminating, the vector.9
His method of choice was larval-control: the systematic identification and destruction of
Anopheles breeding grounds in a given locality. What came to be known as ‘species
sanitation’, involved mosquitoes through a complex cartography – draining marshes, clearing
riverbanks, covering garden wells, oiling ponds, filling ditches with concrete and footprints
with sand (Spielman and D’Antonio, 2001, p. 147; Packard, 2007, pp. 119–120). It is method
characterized by what Shaw et al (2010, p. 375) term an ‘immanent horizontalism’: its success
depended on extensive entomological knowledge, a familiarity with its human inhabitants,
and on abundant, well-organized and, preferably, cheap labour.10
The strategies outlined by Ross’s seminal 1902 text, Mosquito Brigades and How to
Organize them, inspired a generation of public health authorities. The case for species
control was perhaps most persuasively made by Colonel William Gorgas, a surgeon in the
US Army, who oversaw the elimination of yellow fever and malaria from Havana and more
spectacularly, the Panama Canal. But even for those sympathetic to vector control, including
the Rockefeller International Health Division, ‘species sanitation’ posed considerable
financial and logistical challenges. Often where larval control was initially effective, for
instance in Sierra Leone and Liberia, funding flagged before sustainable impacts on
mosquito populations and epidemiology could be made (Bruce-Chwatt, 1977). According to
Ross, the problem was not the method, but rather political will – ‘a single private citizen’
may indeed be able ‘to eradicate malaria from a whole town’, but only if the town was
configured by a governmental logic: ‘a genuine campaign y must always be a permanent
concern of the State’ (1911, quoted in Bruce-Chwatt, 1977, p. 1075).11 While its advocates
propounded a strict demarcation between disease control and broader social improvements,
the practice of insect control inevitably overlapped with that of sanitation, public education,
urban planning and health surveillance. In this regard, species sanitation was often regarded
8 A position characteristic of Italian entomologists and enthusiastically taken up by Mussolini, whose
‘bonification’ approach to malaria involved general improvement in the living conditions and agriculture
practices of the rural population. Integrating malaria control with social development also characterized
the strategies of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the American South (Snowden, 2006; Packard, 2007).
9 That disease eradication should precede development characterized the thinking of the Rockefeller
International Health Division (IHD), a body whose work pre-dated and informed the WHO. For an
excellent history of the IHD, see Farley (2003).
10 The development of the insecticide Paris Green in the 1920s amplified these micro-practices. Paris Green
was selective; unlike oil larvicides it targeted mosquitoes, like anophelese that fed on floating particles. Its
application, therefore, required comprehensive research into the ecological features of the area (Farley,
2003, pp. 112–113).
11 It was an approach that drew from a strong, administrative presence, whether in the form of colonial
garrisons, occupying forces, or in the case of Carlos Alberto Alvarado, the director of Argentina’s malaria
programme, militarized populism introduced by Juan Pero´n (Carter, 2007).
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as too great an investment for a policy of malaria control. Mass distribution of quinine to
treat the disease was cheaper and, while arguably less effective in the long term, did not
require specialist knowledge or pre-existing infrastructure.
Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichlororethane (DDT) rendered those concerns irrelevant. Synthesized
by a Swiss company in the 1930s, DDT powder killed insects at low concentrations and
continued to kill mosquitoes over long periods of time. Applied to the wall of a house, DDT
killed mosquitoes for months. Sprayed on a pond, mosquito larvae died, as did any adult
mosquitoes that came into contact with ducks’ feathers. World War II provided the impetus and
capacities for large-scale engineering of the chemical, and moreover, the justification for its
rapid introduction into the field (Rusell, 2001, p. 4). The public health value of the chemical
was impressively demonstrated in 1944, when the Americans conducted mass DDT-dustings in
occupied Naples to control an epidemic of typhus raging through the city’s overcrowded
slums.12 The overwhelming power of DDT to kill mosquitoes en massewas undeniable: despite
the dire sanitary conditions, the lack of clean water and shelter, the epidemic was brought to
a halt in under three months (Snowden, 2006, p. 199). Residually effective as an aerosol, DDT
provided a means to control malaria over huge areas at a fraction of the cost. Aerial DDT
spraying also rendered extensive ecological and entomological research before intervention
superfluous.13 As epidemiological models came to replace detailed entomological reports,
malaria shifted further from a situated illness to a global pandemic.14 DDT created the
conditions under which malaria could be addressed as a biological entity, a probabilistic
relationship between mosquitoes, malaria parasites and human hosts (Packard, 2007, p. 150).
The post-war institutionalization of public health reinforced the demarcation of malaria from
development. On one hand, the creation of the WHO as distinct from agencies such as the
International Monetary Fund narrowed the scope of public health initiatives. On the other, the
internationalization of public health and the subsequent dismantling of colonial governments
centralized medical expertise; health decisions were no longer the province of local governments
but of committees in Geneva and New York (Farley, 2003, pp. 286–287). Within this institutional
landscape, the ideological significance of malaria control was tied less to the rigour of any
particular method than to the transformative potential of technology under a liberal agenda.15
12 The Naples programme was lead by Fred Soper an epidemiologist and director of the International Health
Division, who was responsible for eliminating the Anopheles gambiae from Brazil just three years earlier
with the use of foci-patrols and Paris Green. He recalls the dramatic nature of the intervention in the
absence of safety testing: ‘it was a very hush-hush subject. The toxicology of DDTwas relatively unknown,
but we did not hesitate to pump it under the clothing of some 3000000 people and assign workers to the
pumps in rooms, which were unavoidably foggy from the DDT dust in the air’ (Snowden, 2006, p. 199).
13 Fred Soper writes about the spatial transformations enabled by DDT: ‘There is no law of diminishing
returns and no indestructibility of a biological entity. The mathematics of eradication is simple; what can
be done in one square meter can be done in two square meters; what can be done in two square meters can
be done in four. Thus, by geometrical progression the world is soon covered’ (Soper, 1962, quoted in Shaw
et al, 2010, p. 380).
14 Edmund Russell makes the striking point that the Insect Control Committee created by Vannevar Bush
after World War II to link the work of the National Defence Research Committee and The Committee on
Medical Research did not include entomologists.
15 Malaria control programmes were regarded as weapons against Communism. Sri Lanka is a tragic
example of what occurs when governments fail to align with that agenda. In 1963 malaria was nearly
eradicated from the island with only six reported cases per year. The socialist tendencies of its government
led to the withdrawal of American funding and consequently, malaria cases numbered one million four
years later (Packard, 2007, p. 171).
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In 1955, when the WHO officially endorsed a GMEP with DDT as its primary weapon,
Ross’s ethos of practical resolve had been transformed into an unswerving faith in scientific
expertise: in the words of Dr Marcoline G. Candau, Director General of the WHO: ‘There
is no other logical choice: malaria eradication is clearly indicated, presents a unique
opportunity and should be implemented as rapidly as possible. Time is of the essence’
(Packard, 2007, p. 155).16
With one exception: Africa, the continent with the gravest disease burden, was never
part of this ‘all out war’ (Litsios, 1996, p. 73). Though the world was convinced that ‘man
has it in his power to eradicate any mosquitoes anywhere’, for the majority of the
malariologists present at the 8th World Health Assembly, the dream of eradication was
geographically specific (Dobson et al, 2000, p. 150). In most of the sub-Saharan African
population, malaria is endemic. Where transmission rates are high and stable, experts
argued, the large-scale and rapid application of DDT was not only unlikely to succeed but
could also exacerbate matters in the long run by interrupting naturally acquired immunity.17
In short, malaria in Africa was not the same as malaria in Europe and the Americas –
interventions into populations with different epidemiological profiles implied equally
different benefits and risks.18 The connection between scientific progress and development
in Africa were of a different order than the rebuilding of Europe after war. When the
programme to eradicate malaria from the globe was launched in 1955, sub-Saharan Africa
was markedly excluded from the definition of global.
The campaign made striking gains: by 1970, 18 countries had achieved eradication, almost 39
per cent of those targeted. But for the most part, these were either island nations or those with
well-developed infrastructures and stable economies (Packard, 2007, p. 160). In other contexts,
comprehensive spraying proved more difficult and more costly; a decade into the programme,
UNICEF’s annual malaria budget had doubled (US$4.1 – $8.8 million) and it was not too long
before the organization began to question the feasibility of its continued support. In recognition
of the limits of health budgets, donor interest, and the increasing number of mosquito species
resistant to DDT, the WHO abandoned its eradication strategy tout court and recommended
the integration of state-level control programmes into primary health-care systems (the WHO,
1974). In 1969, the malaria paradigm switched to a focus on treatment, enabling access to and
enhancing delivery of drugs to patients in need.19
But without international support or scientific interest, governments in endemic regions
were unable to administer preventative methods. After years of vertical health campaigns,
governments were dependant on external funding and their health infrastructures were
weakened (Worboys, 2000, p. 79). Compounded with the increasing levels of resistance to
chloroquine, malaria incidence surged (Greenwood et al, 2005). Now, at the beginning of
16 This is particularly remarkable in light of the fact that the scientific community soon realized that DDT’s
efficacy would sharply decrease over time. In 1945 only a dozen species were known to be insecticide-
resistant; in 1960, DDT-resistant species numbered 139 (Carson, 1962, p. 234).
17 The other central tool of the GMEP was the treatment of infected individuals with choloroquine. Like the
pesticide, this drug also became ineffective as parasites developed resistances.
18 For instance, in the forest-savannah transitional zone in Ghana 58 per cent of the population is infected
with malaria parasites at any given time, without necessarily showing symptoms of the disease (Owusu-
Agyei et al, 2009).
19 As articulated by the WHO’s Alma Ata declaration in 1978, which underlined the importance of ‘primary
health care for all’ enabled by grass-roots community-participation.
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the twenty-first century, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), equipped with new
tools and a hefty bankroll, has reignited the campaign, taking sub-Saharan Africa as its
primary battleground. But though this initiative shares a goal with its predecessor, it
advances a distinct vision of public health underpinned by new constellations in science,
capital and international governance.
An Audacious Goal
So why would anyone want to follow a long line of failures by becoming the
umpteenth person to declare the goal of eradicating malaria? There’s one reason. We
should declare the goal of eradicating malaria because we can eradicate malaria.
Today, I want to make the case that we have a real chance to build the partnerships,
generate the political will, and develop the scientific breakthroughs we need to end this
disease. (Gates and Gates, Malaria Forum, 2007)
This declaration by the newest, and quickly most powerful, actor in public health took many
by surprise – especially those familiar with the history of malaria control. Although the
WHO had received no advance warning that eradication would be foisted on the agenda
of the 2007 Malaria Forum, its director, Margaret Chan, was quick to reiterate the
challenge: ‘I pledge the WHO’s commitment to move forward, and I dare you all to come
along with us’ (ibid.). The following summer, Roll Back Malaria published its Global
Malaria Action Plan. In five succinct but ambitious targets the action plan revived mid-
century dreams of living in a ‘malaria free world’ (RBM, 2008): ‘Until 2010 universal
coverage of interventions such as bed nets and malaria case management is to be achieved.
Malaria cases are to be reduced by 50 per cent in 2010 and by 75 per cent in 2015; deaths
are supposed to sink near zero by 2015. In 8–10 countries malaria is to be eliminated by
2015; and finally in the long term the aim is to eradicate malaria worldwide’ (ibid, p. 12).
This return to eradication resonates with the sweeping global commitments in the
1950–1960s, but with key differences. As opposed to the international system of economic
governance that emerged after World War II, contemporary support for large-scale scientific
endeavours is driven by public-private partnerships, international research collaborations
and large-scale development donors (Schumaker, 2000). Within this current institutional
landscape, global malaria and its control policies are divested of their mooring in social
welfare systems and instead linked to a neoliberal framing of growth (Cooper, 2008, p. 10).
The consequence of this shift is that malaria has become a new kind of economic object. As
witnessed by the emergence of calculative devices to ‘cost’ the disease, whether in terms of
work and school absenteeism, medical expenditures, crop yield, cognitive impairments or
foreign investment. A notable example of this form of accounting is offered by John Gallup
and Jeffery Sachs in their attempt to quantify the ‘growth penalty’ that malaria imposes on
African countries: 1.3 per cent GDP, or at least $12 billion annually (Gallup and Sachs,
2001). Development no longer reduces malaria; rather reducing malaria will generate
development. It is, in other words, a direct cause of poverty.
Second, the increasingly tight interlocking of bioscience and global economy has trans-
formed the value of malaria research (for example, Rajan, 2006). The key generator of that
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value is the BMGF. With their support, international funding of malaria research and control
interventions has quadrupled over the last few years – from $249 million in 2004 to
$1.1 billion in 2008 (McCoy et al, 2009).20 At the heart of the foundation is the Grand
Challenges in Global Health initiative, which seeks to solve world problems through basic
research, in Bill Gates’s words: ‘By harnessing the world’s capacity for scientific innovation,
I believe we can transform health in the developing world and save millions of lives’.21
Although it also supports ‘young, investigators, entrepreneurs and innovators’ its focus is on
biotechnology, such as the development of genetic vector control strategies or a malaria
vaccine. Other goals focus on harnessing the malaria genome to address drug resistance, or
render the parasite and disease’s life cycles more vulnerable through the development of
‘lethal genes’ and genetically modified mosquitoes.22 Accordingly, the foundation mainly
funds R&D and gives out pilot grants for projects that promise breakthroughs, which can
eventually be scaled up to universal coverage (the project we discuss in the following section
received one of those exploratory grants). The approach of BMGF has been criticized widely
for its reliance on magic bullets (for example, Birn, 2005); nevertheless, the speculative logic
attendant to bioeconomy is integral to the revival of malaria eradication.
The malaria targeted by contemporary global health policy is produced through a lack of
money and ‘bold ideas’. Through massive infusions of funds, celebrity power, diplomatic
activity, advances in genomics and bioinformatics and sheer creative pluck, malaria can
presumably be isolated and out-paced. Heavily indebted to Gates for funding and political
support, the WHO focuses on rapid implementation, aggressive scaling up of interventions,
and most important, maintaining the interest of donors and populations (Feachmen and
Sabott, 2008). A global malaria map (see Figure 1) constructed by the Malaria Atlas Project
(MAP) shows that, this time, sub-Saharan Africa will not be excluded; rather, it is the
primary battle field.
The atlas reproduces the comprehensive cartography attendant to DDT spray campaigns,
but as a negative. Where DDT levelled differences between national geographies of similar
socio-economic profiles, innovations enabled by global capital target the bottom billion and
the economic opportunities they present.23 Today’s malaria map plots the space of the free
market, collapsing economic distances through the logic of accumulation while at the same
time reinforcing them (McGoey, 2009). But there are other local malarias, coextensive with
particular infrastructures, social networks and economic conditions. Those malarias generate
their own maps. In what follows we describe one such alternative cartography. It is moving
20 In 2005, BMGF became the largest single donor to malaria research in the world and the US Government
fell to a distant second. Today it is the largest charitable organization in the world, with an endowment of
US $29.7 billion in January 2009. In contrast, the WHO’s malaria budget for 2006 and 2007 was a mere
$137.5 million, over half of which comes from Gates and the other half not entirely certain.
21 As quoted in BBC (28 June 2005) ‘Gates’ millions to tackle disease’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/
4629587.stm, accessed 26 August 2010.
22 The grand challenges are modelled after the list of unsolved mathematical problems produced by
mathematician David Hilbert a century ago. The problematic analogy between global health and algebraic
puzzles not withstanding, Gates’s Grand Challenges that address malaria are: improve existing and create
new vaccines, novel biological and chemical strategies to controlling of insect vectors and limiting drug
resistance through development of new drugs. See http://www.grandchallenges.org/Pages/BrowseByGoal
.aspx.
23 As Bill Gates argues: ‘The poorest two-thirds of the world’s population have some $5 trillion in purchasing
power. it would be a shame if we missed such opportunities’ (Gates, 2008).
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and fragmented, it is a common civic effort, an assemblage of micro-practices. In so doing, it
not only demarcates a target, it also enables and transforms social action. It is a dynamic map,
continuously drawn and redrawn.
Habitual Mappings
Initiated by the Dar es Salaam City Council, partially funded by the BMGF and implemented by
the Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), the Urban Malaria Control Program investigated the efficacy
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es Salaam. In contrast to DDT, Bti is safe for non-target organisms, and because it contains
multiple toxins its use is unlikely to result in resistance. While highly effective in killing larvae,
Bti has only little residual activity and must be re-applied every seven days, a task that involves
continual covering of all potential breeding sites. In addition, up-to-date surveys of adult
mosquito densities are needed to ensure that no larval habitats are missed.
Although the efficacy of microbial insecticide Bti as an alternative to DDT provided the
scientific justification for the study, the protocol of the UMCP emphasized the operational
feasibility of implementing a large-scale larval control programme using Community-Owned
Resource Persons (CORPs). The intervention on trial therefore was a task of integration: to
develop sustainable larval control into a decentralized municipal administrative system
(Mukabana et al, 2006). Originally instituted as part of post-independence reforms in the
1960s aimed at eradicating social inequities, CORPs were intended to serve as an
administrative bridge between citizens and the municipality. They were appointed by
members living within Ten Cell Units – a cluster of about 10 houses – and performed basic
public health services and small-scale maintenance tasks, such as garbage collection, road
cleaning and soap distribution. Like many national programmes, the CORPs fell victim to
economic reforms in the 1980s, and though some members continued to work on a
volunteer basis, with little administrative or financial support from the city council, they no
longer functioned as a coordinated system. The UMCP provided the City Medical Office of
Health with the necessary funds to recuperate the scheme. With a weekly stipend of roughly
six dollars (US), the CORPs were responsible for the weekly application of insecticide as well
as larval and adult mosquito surveillance (HLC). What was on trial was a system of
management: to prove larval control could be tailored to the reservoir of labour available
and ultimately, taken up as a state-led effort.
First and foremost, the UMCP was a complex task of detection. To generate the conditions
under which larval surveillance and monitoring are possible demands an elaborate reconfi-
guration of city space along man-mosquito population dynamics. Mosquito behaviour is
associated with human activity; they are just as likely to breed in ponds as they are in the sunlit
pools left by human foot-prints. Dar es Salaam encompasses a diverse range of habitats
including cattle troughs, rain gutters, water buckets and ponds caused by poor drainage.
Advances in Remote Sensing Technology, Global Geographical Information Systems and
Global Positioning Systems provide the tools to locate these habitats and relate the diverse
ecology of the city to the distribution of disease.
However, the work of larval control was not the province of the scientists but rather the
CORPs; while geographically accurate, these maps bore no relation to the lived-experience
of the city. The team developed a protocol for ‘participatory mapping’ to integrate these different
ways of knowing Dar es Salaam. The process began with a CORP-drawn preliminary sketch
map of the area to which they were allocated. The individual breeding-ground anchored these
cartographic descriptions; CORPs would identify potential mosquito habitats and note their
position in relation to garden plots, houses, roads and ponds. These graphic representations were
combined with descriptions of the area, for instance names of residents (Dongus et al, 2007).
Equipped with this preliminary sketch map and description forms, a technical team
accompanied the CORP to their area. Walking the periphery of their site, the technical team
marked its position on an aerial photograph taken of Dar es Salaam, making regular stops
to mark problem-sites and areas yet to be surveyed. In some neighbourhoods, learning where
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to spray was more taxing than in others: homeowners, particularly those in the wealthy
neighbourhoods, were not always prepared to welcome CORPs into their private gardens.24
Boundaries – whether fences, roads or reluctant owners – were thus marked and redrawn on
the large map held at the municipal office, while sketch maps were adapted according to
everyday experiences of the fieldworkers negotiating the field (Vanek et al, 2006).
Although they warrant far greater attention, we do not have the time to pursue the subtle
approximation that took place between sketching, technical plotting and digitization here.
What we want to stress is the way these maps had to be constantly revisited, their points of
reference reformed and their shape revised. To monitor a rapidly changing field situation
demands the analysis of images at multiple times. Timothy Mitchell describes the
cartography of Egypt as an act of removal. The gap opened between field and map, he
argues, reframed questions about the political nature of boundary-making as a problem of
representational accuracy. Cartographic knowledge, in other words, disaggregates the social
and political features of landscape into a series of data points.
The project clearly had implications for other African cities. However, the translation of
urban place into scientific space in Dar es Salaam did not serve to engender the placelessness of
the lab. The purpose of the UMCP maps was rather to enable practical action on the ground
(Henke, 2000). Adhering to administrative boundaries and adapted to personal preferences,
the maps allow CORPs to orient themselves in the field; they transformed the city into a venue
of disease management (Figure 2). By opening the process of cartographic signification
to constant revision, the act of mapping mosquito breeding grounds is not one of removal
but rather an active network of references and practices that translate each other. Here, the
Figure 2: CORP with PhD student, dipping urban ponds for larvae, picture Ann Kelly.
24 The majority of these cases effectively resolved by formalizing the CORP through bureaucratic process and
symbolic codification: for instance, informing the municipal malaria coordinator, who wrote a stamped
letter or by giving CORPs uniforms.
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production of a map is an event (or rather an aggregation of events) that renders novel
relations visible, and one whose inductive dimensions are consensus-driven and prospective.
The UMDP raises questions about how the production of knowledge overlaps with the
civic management of public spaces. In his analysis of the development of urban studies,
Thomas Gieyrn illuminates the ways in which Chicago was made both field-site and object
of experimental manipulation. Oscillating between thick description and abstraction opened
up Chicago for social intervention: under sociological observation, ‘the city’, Geiyrn
suggests, ‘is not just a laboratory’, he argues ‘but also a “clinic” where the “social engineer
can engage in “prediction” and “diagnosis and treatment” of the city’s ills” ’ (Gieyrn, 2006,
p. 15). The success of larval control in reducing malaria, even in ‘sub-optimal’ conditions,
had implications for African cities everywhere. In one article, the team concludes:
Here we demonstrate that y protective effectiveness can be achieved under routine,
real-world programmatic conditions in a major African city y We conclude that
larval control should now be reconsidered as an option for integrated malaria control
programs in Africa. (Geissbu¨hler et al, 2007)
However, making Dar es Salaam into a ‘truth-spot’ was not merely a matter of turning its
back allies into either ‘unique’ or ‘typical’ spaces. The city, rather, is on-the-make: Dar es
Salaam comes about through an alignment of research protocol with civic imagination:
we anticipate that even greater impacts can be achieved as the proficiency of operational
teams matures through direct experience and innovation in response to locally-specific
operational challenges, as well as improved institutional and financing mechanisms. (ibid.)
The experimental practices described here are catalysts; they integrate the resources of
international science into the mechanisms of the state, with the hopes that its epistemic
provisions will break those chains of dependence. Neither entirely experimental object nor
analytical referent, Dar es Salaam is the means through which public health knowledge is
amplified through a convergence of method and place. Claims about the city became
increasingly believable as the incidence of malaria decreased. The emplacement of the
UMCP amplified the knowledge it produced; science here is a vector moving from project to
polis and from scientific protocol to civic principal.
Conclusion: Practices of Continual Co-existence
Entangled with the history of mosquito species and the human race, the parasite’s
extraordinary transmission capacity is tied to its intimate relationship with individual hosts,
to its ability to respond and change with its environment. Similarly, mosquitoes’ behaviour has
shaped, and been shaped by, agricultural techniques, animal husbandry and the planning of
cities. In Dar es Salaam, for example, mosquitoes could once be counted on to feed indoors.
But after decades of spraying homes with insecticide and covering beds with insecticide-treated
nets, mosquito populations are now more likely to feed in the streets (Geissbu¨hler et al, 2007).
These relationships are formatted by the codes of co-existence – not by the rules of war and
belong to the back alleys, rather than on the front lines of global health. Each time the CORPs
survey the streets and apply Bti, the parasitological exchange between man and mosquito gets
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subtly re-adjusted and the landscape of infection changed. Focusing on the practices of malaria
control, as exemplified in the UMCP project in Tanzania, not only produces different maps of
malaria and underlines just how much work goes into sustaining successful control, but also
evokes malaria as a product of relations.
Malaria is the outcome of a complex relational exchange; it is textured by unpredictable
proximities that disappear when malaria is scaled to a global matter. The form of control
exemplified by the UMCP is partial and fragmentary, a result of mapping landscapes and
measuring the properties of parasites within populations. Not a war to be won, but a moving
target. The project relies not on a revolution in synthetic biology, but on evolving local
knowledge of malaria-places – the continuous sketching of movements between man and
mosquito. This malaria requires endless and arduous effort, administering, mapping and
managing. And the result is modest: not an integrated, over-arching socio-ecological model,
but specific and fragmented maps of neighbourhoods in Dar es Salaam.
Today, for many who have spent years working in public health, the immediate problem
of an eradication programme is that it will create false expectations, leading governments to
abandon the mundane, budget-draining but ultimately, effective control policies (Hommel,
2008). While the renewed focus on eradication has set free new funding streams and creative
intervention ideas, out-witting this ancient disease might not be as easy as one might hope,
and an eradication approach could lead to unintended consequences.25 The entomological
focus of the UMCP, however, hints at something more profound: the technological emphasis
of current malaria research – on vaccines or genetic control – simply does not suit its object.
Malaria is not static; it is an evolving vector between human habits and mosquito habitats.
To understand the disease and to control it, therefore, requires the kind of investigative
latitude that enables evidence to be yoked to the available resources on the ground. Like
other proponents of a historical, social-ecological approach to public health, we understand
disease as contingent, bodies as situated and propose that a narrow biomedical under-
standing of malaria as a parasitological exchange inevitability leads to unsuccessful strate-
gies of control (Turnbull, 1989; Nash, 2006; Packard, 2007). Malaria must be managed
locally if it is going to be managed at all.26
The current shift in commitment from management to technological fixes represents an
abandonment of local capacity. The innovative solutions sought by the BMGF are a matter
of transfer: technologies invented somewhere are retooled and relocated to improve life
elsewhere. Indeed, for a while the UMCP was funded by the BMGF, the foundation lost
interest when it moved from trialling to sustaining the project. This abandonment reflects a
tension between the innovative possibilities of aggressive and targeted funding and the
ecological and socio-political dimensions of disease. It also raises the critical question of how
25 Working around mosquitoes’ resistance to DDT and other insecticides is a considerable public health
challenge. The first cases of drug resistance against the current first-line treatment artemisinin, a
compound of history’s first herb against the fevers q%ıngh%ao, were confirmed in Cambodia in 2008 (Noedl
et al, 2008), and have spread ever since – despite containment efforts resistant parasites have already
reached China, Myanmar and Vietnam (Malaria Consortium, 2009). Malaria experts are acutely aware
that, with the current tools, eradication in Africa is not achievable (for example, Tanner and de Savigny,
2008, p. 82).
26 As historians have shown, disappearance of malaria in Europe and the Americas did not come by way of
vaccine, but by screening houses, draining swamps, better sanitation, treatment and monitoring of humans
in conjunction with general socio-economic developments (Humphreys, 2001; Packard, 2007).
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global attention shapes its object. The strategic global map leaves out the malaria that begins
where the pavement ends, in blocked drains and discarded plastic cups. Commitment to
controlling this malaria might seem like a bad business decision, but we argue it is a good long-
term investment. The modest malaria addressed by interventions like UMCP cultivates a civic
attention that brings about lasting connections between development and health. This malaria
is part of a game of coping and co-existence. Its temporality is inscribed in administrative
practice, sketch maps and a larval dipper. Although invisible at the scale of the global
epidemic, we would argue that this practice is potentially generative of a more sustainable
re-configuration of the relations between mosquitoes, humans and parasites.
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